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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
By WILEY H. DAvIs*
It has long been recognized that a large percentage of the cases decided
by the appellate courts of Georgia are decided in whole or in part upon
procedural points. Because of this fact, any attempt to survey the matters
decided on such points during any twelve-month period must include reference to many cases, however brief the treatment. In making such a survey, one frequently faces the problem of deciding whether a holding is
based primarily upon procedure or whether the case should be considered
substantive in nature. Of course, some procedure is involved in the hearing,
trial or appeal of every case that reaches our reports, but in many instances the mechanics of obtaining an adjudication are purely incidental,
and the case is decided upon its merits. Such cases have generally been
omitted from the present treatment. Other cases, just as obviously, turn
purely upon points of procedure, and these cases the writer has attempted
to include with such comment as space will allow. Some reference has also
been made to what may be termed "borderline" cases, that is to say, cases
which turn upon substantive points but which set out enough of the procedure to furnish interesting examples or suggestions for the practitioner
with a similar case. Certain of these cases might prove valuable, even
though no specific ruling has been envoked upon points of procedure.
The survey indicates that, aside from statutory changes and some revision of the court rules, there have been no revolutionary changes in procedure during the last year. Some new trends are indicated, but most of the
decisions cited will be found to embody time-honored and familiar principles of law. The present article is offered in the hope that it may serve
to refresh the memory of the more experienced practitioner, and that it
may furnish him with some recent authority for what he probably already
knows. It is also hoped that to the student or to the stranger to our practice it may give a bird's eye-view of the procedure in our courts during one
year. References have been made to changes in the statutes and in the rules
of the appellate courts.
ACTIONS AND PARTIES

An excellent example of consolidation of actions was presented by the
case of Craddock v. Foster.' In that case a wife filed an action for alimony
without divorce against her husband, and subsequently he filed an action
against her for divorce in the same court. When called for trial, the cases
were consolidated by consent and tried as one case, a single verdict being
*Editor, The Harrison Company, Atlanta; LL.B., 1936, University of Georgia;
Co-author Georgia Practice and Procedure with Arnold Shulman (The Harrison
Company, 1949); Co-editor, City Code of Atlanta, Georgia Code Annotated; Member Georgia and Atlanta Bar Associations.
1. 205 Ga. 534, 54 S.E.2d 406 (1949).
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rendered. The court held that where cases are so consolidated, they become merged in a single case.
There were several cases illustrating the extensive purposes for which
the action of trover can be used. One of the more interesting purposes is
to recover physical possession of documents or papers constituting choses
in action. It was held, for instance, that one entitled to possession of a
deed for land may maintain trover in the "Jack Jones" form for its recovery.' It was pointed out that where the action is purely to recover
possession and establish title to the deed itself, and no issue is raised as
to the original delivery of the deed, the action does not involve title to
land.
A similar use of the action of trover was presented in the case of Franklin v. Pope,' wherein it was held that one entitled under federal statutes
to United States government bonds could maintain trover to recover
them from a person wrongfully withholding possession.
Trover was used as a remedy for fraud in a case holding that where
property is exchanged for other property represented to be free of encumbrance, which is in fact encumbered, the wronged party may recover his
original property in trover, 4 and in another case holding that where
chattels are delivered to the vendee of realty subsequent .to the sale thereof
upon his representation that they were included in the sale, when actually
they were not so included, such delivery does not constitute a gift or
waiver, and the true owner may maintain trover for the return of such
chattels. 5
The importance of careful selection of the proper type of action is welldemonstrated in those cases where one of the remedies which might be
brought is peculiar to one sex or the other, or where a party's right is determined by his capacity. In the case of Perthus v. Paul,' for example, it
was held that where a man brought an action against a woman, alleging
that he had been induced to give up his job and incur heavy expenses because of the defendant's promise to marry him if he came to Georgia from
a distant state, and that the defendant was unable to contract such a marriage because of an undissolved previous marriage, an action for fraud and
deceit was set forth. The court indicated that had the action been construed as one ex contractu, i.e., an action for breach of promise, the plaintiff's right of recovery would have been very doubtful. The court went on
to say that in a case where the allegations set forth facts sounding both
in tort and in breach of contract, but wherein only one of these types of
action is maintainable, the petition, in the absence of a special demurrer,
will be construed so as to uphold and not defeat the action! It was further
2.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Breen v. Barfield, 80 Ga. App. 615, 56 S.E.2d 791 (1949), distinguishing Dobbs v.
First Nat. Bank of Atlanta, 65 Ga. App. 796, 16 S.E.2d 485 (1941), in which trover
was used in an attempt to compel delivery of a deed, and wherein it was held that
such an action would involve title to land.
81 Ga. App. 729, 59 S.E.2d 726 (1950).
Milam v. Gray, 80 Ga. App. 356, 56 S.E.2d 168 (1949).
Gostin v. Scott, 80 Ga. App. 630, 56 S.E.2d 778 (1949).
81 Ga. App. 133, 58 S.E.2d 190 (1950).
A somewhat similar rule is that stated in Buice v. Smith, 81 Ga. App. 658, 59 S.E.2d
676 (1950), to the effect that after verdict and in the absence of a demurrer, where
the petition is subject to two constructions, that one will be placed upon it which
supports the jury's verdict.
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held that, " 'When a transaction partakes of the nature both of a tort and
a contract, the party complainant may waive the one and rely solely upon
the other . . . [and] Where a petition can be construed either as a suit in

contract or as an action for a breach of duty arising out of the contract,
the latter construction will be adopted'."
The Court of Appeals was evenly divided on the question as to whether
a woman can recover against a tort-feasor for injuries to her husband resulting in a loss of consortium There is considerable discussion and authority set forth upon this point, but the question was not decided because
the case was controlled by the fact that the petition showed on its face
that the husband had assumed the risk of injury, and a general demurrer
was properly sustained on that point.
The courts continued to be very strict in enforcing the prohibition against
pursuing inconsistent remedies, and to stress the importance of electing
the proper remedy at the proper time. It was held that where a petition
shows on its face that a prior inconsistent remedy has been pursued, a
general demurrer will be sustained." We are again cautioned that in
order to be binding the election need not be pursued to judgment, the court
having held: "This court has more than once ruled that there need be no
adjudication of the plaintiff's rights in the prior proceeding in order to
make available the defense of election of remedies."'"
Perhaps the most important inovation in the law affecting parties to
actions in recent years is the legislative declaration that the beneficiary of
a contract made between other parties for his benefit may maintain an
The courts have not as
action against the promisor on such contract.'
yet had occasion to decide many cases based upon this amendment. They
have, however, made it clear that the amendment is not to be applied to
contracts entered into prior to the passage of the amendment, this ruling
being based upon the reasoning that to give such effect to the law would
violate the provisions of the State and Federal Constitutions relating to the
impairment of contracts. 2 In the case of Reistnan v. Massey,' which was
decided subsequent to the enactment of the amendment, the Court of
Appeals held that : "Only parties to sealed instruments may sue or be
sued thereon." However, it should be noted that this case was not adjudicated on the basis of third party beneficiaries, but rather on the question
of a misjoinder of defendants. From this, it might well be argued that
this ruling is dicta as to Code Section 3-1o8 rather than authority to the
effect that the amendment does not apply to sealed instruments. The
Reisman case cites authority older than the amendment, and certainly states
a correct general principle of law except as the same may be modified by
the amendment of 1949.
8. McDade v. West, 80 Ga. App. 481, 56 S.E.2d 299 (1949).
9. Evans v. Citizens & Sou. Nat. Bank, 206 Ga. 441. 57 S.E.2d 541 (1950). See also
Allen v. Community Invest. Corp., 81 Ga. App. 65, 57 S.E.2d 703 (1950).
10. Evans v. Citizens & Sou. Nat. Bank, supra note 9.
11. Ga. Laws 1949, p. 455, amending GA. CODE § 3-108 (1933). For a more detailed discussion of this statute and its probable effect, see O'Neal and Quarles, Some Significant Recent Georgia Legislation, 1 MERCER L. REV. 27, 39 (1949).
12. Guest v. Stone, 206 Ga. 239, 56 S.E.2d 247 (1949).
13. 81 Ga. App. 277, 58 S.E.2d 528 (1950).
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Several rulings dealt with the question of governmental agencies and
their employees as parties defendant. In one of these, it was held that an
action in trover will lie against a United States Postmaster for wrongful
detention of property coming into his possession by virtue of his office."
In the matter of actions brought against agencies of the state, it was
held that Code Section 95-17 10 provides the sole method of suing the State
Highway Department, and that a petition in which it was attempted to.
join the department as a defendant with a city, without showing that the
proceeding was under such Code section, was subject to demurrer as to the
department. 15
The case of Arnold v. Walton 6 held that a county can not be sued for
damages resulting from the operation of a hydro-electric plant owned by
the county, it being pointed out that "A county is not liable to suit for any
cause of action unless made so by statute." The same case held that, in
the absence of a statute, a joint action against a tort-feasor's insurance carrier for the purpose of "fixing the liability" of the insurance carrier is not
maintainable.
As to parties in actions for wrongful homicide, it was held that the
Act of 1943 which provides: "No court, commission, or quasi-judicial
body shall discriminate against any person because of his illegitimate birth,"
does not amend Code Section IO5-1302, so as to authorize an illegitimate
child or children to recover damages for the tortious death of the father."
While it is a well-recognized principle of law that additional parties may
be made in equity when necessary, their rights must be protected. Where
additional parties defendant were made, and an interlocutory injunction
granted against
them without any notice or rule nisi, such order was held
1
erroneous. "
There was one very interesting development in the matter of parties
to divorce actions. This was provided by the case of Chambers v. Chainbers,'" and will be more fully discussed in the portion of this article devoted
to domestic relations. Suffice it to say here that the Chambers case held that
a person who is non compos mefitis, though not legally adjudged to be insane, is incapable of being served with a petition for divorce; and a judgment in an uncontested divorce suit which is predicated upon such service
may be set aside in a proceeding by a next friend.
PLEADINGS, PROCESS AND SERVICE

The courts continue to insist upon a high degree of exactitude in plead14. Williams v. McDaniel, 80 Ga. App. 614, 56 S.E.2d 926 (1949).
15. Davis v. City of Barnesville, 80 Ga. App. 3, 54 S.E.2d 915 (1949). Code Section
95-1710 provides in substance that the State Highway Department shall defend
suits against counties, and be responsible for damages awarded aginst counties
whenever the cause of action originates on highways over which the department
has assumed jurisdiction, and that a county sued upon such a cause of action may
vouch in the department to defend the action.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

205 Ga. 606, 54 S.E.2d 424 (1949).
Ga. Laws 1943, p. 538, GA. CODE ANN. § 74-204 (1946 Rev.).
Brinkley v. Dixie Construction Co., 205 Ga. 415, 54 S.E.2d 267 (1949).
Fitzpatrick v. Bloodworth, 206 Ga. 366, 53 S.E.2d 917 (1949).
206 Ga. 796, 58 S.E.2d 814 (1950). See, however, Huguley v. Huguley, 204 Ga. 692,
51 S.E.2d 445 (1949), holding that insanity is not per se a defense to a divorce suit
brought on grounds originating during sanity.
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ing, particularly in the petition, and to hold that where pleadings are ambiguous or contradictory they will be construed most strongly against the
pleader."' Thus, it was held in an action for damages resulting from a
grade-crossing collision, that failure of the petition to show what part of
the locomotive was struck by the automobile involved rendered insufficient
the allegation that failure of the railroad to flag the crossing or provide
safety devices was negligence resulting in the damage."
The case of Conney v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp." enumerates three
methods of pleading the principal-agent relationship in cases where it is
sought to hold the principal liable for torts committed by the agent:
(i) Set out the facts as they actually exist, or as they are presumed to
exist by legal fiction or presumption. Although it is generally unnecessary
to plead matters of law, if this method is used it will usually be necessary
for the petitioner to set out his legal conclusions under which he contends
that the named principal is liable. The question as to whether the conclusions are good in law can then be decided on demurrer. (2) Allege by
a simple, direct statement that the defendant (principal) by his agent committed the wrongful act. This, as against general or special demurrer, is
sufficient, insofar as alleging agency is concerned. (3) Allege by a simple,
direct statement that the wrongful act was committed by the defendant's
servant and was committed in the prosecution of the principal's business
and within the scope of the servant's authority. This last method, also, is
good as against general or special demurrer.
There have been a number of cases which turn upon the sufficiency of
the petition, and several of these will be discussed as illustrative of the
amount of detail necessary to be set forth, It was held, for instance, that
a petition showing that a deceased came to his death because of broken
and defective guard rails on a bridge was subject to demurrer in an action
for wrongful homicide, in that such petition did not show on which side
of the bridge the guard rails were broken and that this defect was the
proximate cause of the car's leaving the bridge.24
Although where negligence is properly alleged it is a jury question, it
may be decided upon demurrer where the petition clearly shows on its
face that the injuries complained of were due to a lack of the proper degree
of care on the part of the plaintiff, or where it shows that whatever the
cause of such injuries they were not due to the negligence of the defendant.2 "

The Georgia courts do not attach much importance to the purely formal
parts of the petition as distinguished from more substantial matters. For
this reason it was held that a petition will not be adjudged bad for a mere
typographical error in the caption; and where a petition was headed,
"Georgia, Coweta County," but filed in the Fulton Superior Court and
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Independent Life, etc., Ins. Co. v. Pantone, 80 Ga. App. 426, 56 S.E.2d 153 (1949).
Hensley v. Georgia & Florida R.R., 80 Ga. App. 67, 55 S.E.2d 259 (1949).
81 Ga. App. 324, 58 S.E.2d 559 (1950).
Coweta County v. Banister, 80 Ga. App. 794, 57 S.E.2d 445 (1950).
Ford v. S.A. Lynch Corp., 79 Ga. App. 481, 54 S.E.2d 336 (1949). See also Bessman
v. Greyhound Bus Depot, 81 Ga. App. 428, 58 S.E.2d 922 (1950). The language of
the Bessman case is: "Ordinarily, questions of negligence and proximate cause are
for determination by a jury, but it is the duty of the courts to decide such questions
as a matter of law on demurrer in clear and indisputable cases."
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obviously intended to institute a suit in Fulton Superior Court, such petition
was not demurrable merely because of the heading.28
The danger of attempting to negative a defense in affirmative pleading
was again pointed out in the case of Swofford v. Glaze.! In this case it was
held that the attempt in the petition to negative the defense of accord and
satisfaction was inadequate and that a proper demurrer would have been
sustained. The plaintiff, however, was fortunate in that the defendant
failed to file a demurrer, in the absence of which the court permitted the
petitioner to proceed with his case as laid.
In the matter of the discription of land to be included in petitions relating to title thereof, it was adjudicated that where in a complaint for land
the description as contained in the petition would be insufficient to enable
the sheriff to execute a writ of possession in case of recovery, such description is insufficient, and the petition subject to general demurrer."
However, in the case of Manning v. Carroll, an action for specific performance,
it was held that though the description of the land as contained in the contract sued upon was insufficient to be the basis of a decree for specific performance, a definite and specific description could be supplied by amendment, and further, that if this description could be supplied by amendment,
as a matter of course it could also be supplied by proof. Where the action
is for the rescission of a contract to purchase land, or for a reduction of
the purchase price because of a deficiency in the amount of land, no abstract
of title need be attached to the petition."
Recent cases have shown that the old legal maxim that ex delicto actions
cannot be converted into actions ex contractu still holds good, as does the
converse.
This rule also holds where, instead of filing an amendment,
the plaintiff strikes his entire petition and attempts to file an amended petition setting up an entirely new cause of action. 2 While on the matter of
amended petitions, it should be pointed out that a plaintiff, otherwise entitled to amend, may amend his original petition by striking it in its entirety
and substituting in lieu thereof an amended petition, as long as the fundamental rules relating to amendments are complied with.3 This procedure
should be useful in those cases in which, due to numerous amendments,
pleadings have become somewhat confused and difficult to follow.
The courts have also reiterated the fundamental rule that it is error
to permit the addition of a party plaintiff by an amendment to an action at
law, thus converting a suit by an individual into one by a partnership. Of
course, additional parties may be made in equity, but where additional parties defendant are made and equitable relief granted against them without
any notice to such parties or any opportunity for hearing, the order granting such relief is erroneous. 3
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Craddock v. Foster, 205 Ga. 534, 54 S.E.2d 406 (1949).
206 Ga. 574, 57 S.E.2d 823 (1950).
Dodd v. Madaris, 206 Ga. 497, 57 S.E.2d 597 (1950).
206 Ga. 158, 56 S.E.2d 278 (1949).
Norris v. Coffee, 206 Ga. 759, 58 S.E.2d 812 (1950).
See Ingram & LeGrand Lumber Co. v. Bunn, 81 Ga. App. 93, 58 S.E.2d 193 (1950)
and Horne v. Skinner, 206 Ga. 491, 57 S.E.2d 576 (1950).
McConnell v. Shropshire, 80 Ga. App. 677, 57 S.E.2d 293 (1950).
Joremias v. Western Union Co., 78 Ga. App. 142, 50 S.E.2d 797 (1948).
Walker v. Sheehan, 80 Ga. App. 606, 56 S.E.2d 628 (1949).
Fitzpatrick v. Bloodworth, 206 Ga. 366, 53 S.E.2d 917 (1949).
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Numerous instances may be cited to show the broad and continuous use
of the amendment in Georgia pleadings. In an action for bail trover, a
mere clerical error in the description of the property sued for may be corrected by amendment as long as the same property is described.' An affidavit of illegality is amendable, provided it is shown that the grounds of
amendment were unknown at the time of the original affidavit.:;7

Also

amendable is a money rule by a client against an attorney."" The petition
in an action upon a check is amendable to show waiver of presentment)'
There were several cases adjudicated upon the question of time of
amendment. An amendment may be offered upon the announcement of a
judge that he will sustain a general demurrer to the petition. However,
after the order sustaining such demurrer has been signed, it is too late to
amend." It was held proper for the trial judge in an action for damages
to an automobile to allow the plaintiff to amend during the course of the
trial, so that a measure of damage based on the difference in the market
value of the automobile immediately before and after the collision was
substituted for a measure of damage based on the cost of the automobile."
Of course, the mere tender and allowance of an amendment without a proper filing would be of no effect. Thus, it was held that where a demurrer
was set for hearing before one judge of the superior court, and counsel for
the plaintiff secured the allowance of an amendment to the petition from
another judge of the same court but failed to file it, the demurrer would
proceed upon the pleadings before the court regardless of such amendment. 12 Perhaps the ultimate case relating to the allowance of amendment
relative to the time thereof is that of Alerck v. Flynn, in which it was held
that where a judgment overruling a general demurrer to a petition is reversed, such petition is amendable up until the remittitur is made the judgment of the trial court, but not thereafter.
The conclusive effect of an amendment to a petition was pointed out
in the case of Clements v. Hollingsworth," in which case it was held that
where, in reviewing a judgment on demurrer, an appellate court has ruled
that the petition is insufficient, but subsequently the deficiencies indicated
are corrected by amendment, such former ruling no longer applies to the
case.
In the field of process and service, one of the more salient developments
during the survey period was the statutory procedure set up for service
upon nonresident and unauthorized insurance companies. This was created
by legislation known as the "Unauthorized Insurers Process Act."" This
statute will be codified and will probably appear in the next supplement of
the Georgia Code Annotated as Chapter 5 6-6A. The act in question was
passed pursuant to federal statute,'" and provides for service of process
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Forsyth v. South Side Motors, Inc., 79 Ga. App. 719, 54 S.E.2d 445 (1949).
Aycock v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 80 Ga. App. 797, 57 S.E.2d 510 (1950).
Aiken v. Richardson, 80 Ga. App. 591, 56 S.E.2d 782 (1949).
Lanier v. Waddell, 80 Ga. App. 713, 57 S.E.2d 240 (1950).
Interlochen Estates, Inc. v. Bank of Atlanta, 206 Ga. 570, 57 S.E.2d 924 (1950).
Bedgood v. Rogers, 81 Ga. App. 343, 58 S.E.2d 473 (1950).
Cantrell v. Cooley, 206 Ga. 704, 58 S.E.2d 426 (1950).
205 Ga. 622, 54 S.E.2d 649 (1949).
206 Ga. 255, 56 S.E.2d 505 (1949).
Ga. Laws 1950, p. 58.
Pub. L. No. 15, 79 Cong., 1st Sess. § 340, as amended.
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on nonresident insurance companies doing business in Georgia by mail or
otherwise. This law further provides that the solicitation of business, the
issuance of a policy, collection of premiums or other transaction of business
within the state constitutes an appointment of the Insurance Commissioner
as an agent for service. There is also provision for service upon solicitors
and collectors of the insurance company, and upon persons delivering policies.
The case of Carroll v. Celanese Corporation" contains an interesting
discussion of what constitutes personal service in a case in which such service is strictly necessary. In that case, the officer serving process containing a
restraining order testified that lie went to the defendant with the papers
and told him that he had some papers for him. The defendant refused to
accept the paper, whereupon the offier "stuck it at him," and upon his
continued refusal to accept the paper dropped it at his feet. The court
held that such facts, if duly proved, would show valid personal service upon
the defendant.
As to service on insane persons, it was ruled that a person who is non
compos mentis, though not legally adjudged to be an insane person, is
incapable of being served with a petition for divorce; and a judgment in
an uncontested divorce suit which is predicated upon such service may be
set aside in a proceeding by a next friend."
Amendment of process is discussed in the case of Gay v.Sylvania Central
Rv. Co.,49 wherein it was held that where process contains a command to
the defendant to appear in court at a certain time for a certain purpose,*
and where such process is executed by the proper officer, the mere fact that
the formal order to the officer to execute the process was omitted would,
at most, be a mere clerical error, which could be cured by amendment under
the Code. 0
During the period studied, a large number of cases were decided on demurrer. Many of these cases have already been discussed in relation to
actions, parties and the petition, but there are several cases which seem to
illustrate points relating specifically to general and special demurrers.
These will here be considered.
As a matter of procedure, it was adjudged that a hearing on demurrer
may be held under the Constitution of 1945"1 not only in vacation and at
but at any time, either before or after the appearance day of the
chambers
2
case.
The importance of filing a demurrer when necessary and the possibility
of waiver of rights by failing to file such pleading were pointed out in the
case of Swofford v. Glaze; 3 and, as we have already seen in the discussion
205 Ga. 493, 54 S.E.2d 221 (1949).
Chambers v. Chambers, 206 Ga. 796, 58 S.E.2d 814 (1950).
Gay v. Sylvania Central Ry. Co., 79 Ga. App. 362, 53 S.E.2d 713 (1949).
GA. CODE § 24-104(6) (1933) provides that every court shall have power to amend
and control its processes and orders and make them conformable to law and justice,
and to amend its own records so as to make them conform to the truth. See also
GA. CODE § 81-1201 (1933), as to discretion of courts in allowing amendments.
51. GA. CONST. Art. VI, § 4,1 8, GA. CODE ANN. § 2-3908 (1948 Rev.).
47.
48.
49.
50.

52.
53.

Reardon v. Bland, 206 Ga. 633, 58 S.E.2d 377 (1950).
206 Ga. 574, 57 S.E.2d 823 (1950).
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of the petition, questions of negligence may be decided on demurrer in
unequivocal cases."4
The rule to the effect that where some of the relief prayed for in a peti-.
tion is proper, it is error to sustain a general demurrer to the whole pleading, was applied with equal force to a cross-action which stated a cause
of action for part of the relief prayed * and, of course, where, in such a case,
a demurrer is wrongfully sustained, all further proceedings are rendered
nugatory.7 The rule. as to a wrongful ruling upon a demurrer rendering
further proceedings nugatory was also applied in a case in which the demurrers of one of two joint defendants were improperly overruled."
The effect of the ruling upon demurrer on the remaining pleadings was
further illustrated in the case of Rhiner v. Moore, 7 in which case it was
held that where, in an equitable complaint for land, the court, in sustaining a general demurrer, left no substantial pleading standing on behalf of
the plaintiff, it was error to order that the case stand and proceed as a suit
for land* Here, too, proceedings under such erroneous order were of no
effect.
As to the construction of a ruling on demurrers, both general and
special, the Court of Appeals again held: "Where a demurrer to a petition
contains grounds of both general and special demurrer, and the trial judge,
without specifying the grounds or the basis of his decision, passes a general
order sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the petition, the judgment
will be treated as sustaining the entire demurrer on all its grounds, and the
special as well as the general grounds must be considered on review, if the
petition is not subject to the latter. The rule is otherwise where the order
of dismissal is expressly limited to the general grounds or from its language
it may be so construed, in which event the special grounds will not be considered." 8
The necessity for a correct and immediate analysis of the force of the
court's ruling on demurrer was set forth in a holding to the effect that
where a court sustains a demurrer to a petition, and orders the plaintiff to
amend, and he does so, such ruling becomes the law of the case; and there
is no error in dismissing the petition as amended where the terms of the
original demurrer are not met, regardless of whether or not such original
demurrer was well-taken."1
The "law of the case" rule was also applied to a subsequent contrary
ruling by a court after having once ruled on a demurrer. Thus, in a suit
to restrain and enjoin a dispossessory proceeding, after determining on
demurrer that the parties were proper, the court could not, in the absence
of a change of conditions, and at a subsequent term, override its former
54. McDade v. West, 80 Ga. App. 481, 56 S.E.2d 299 (1949) ; Ford v. S. A. Lynch Corp.,
79 Ga. App. 481, 54 S.E.2d 336 (1949); Bessman v. Greyhound Bus Depot, 81 Ga.
App. 428, 58 S.E.2d 922 (1950).
55. Bowles v. White, 206 Ga. 433, 57 S.E.2.d 547 (1950). See also Snyder v. Prichard,
80 Ga. App. 344, 56 S.E.2d 158 (1949), to the effect that it is error to grant a motion to strike in its entirety an answer which sets forth some defense.
56. Brigman v. Brenner, 206 Ga. 230, 56 S.E.2d 477 (1949).
57. 206 Ga. 647, 58 S.E.2d 184 (1950).
58. Vickers v. Georgia Power Company, 79 Ga. App. 456, 54 S.E.2d 152 (1949).
59. Truitt v. Southern Ry. Co., 80 Ga. App. 790, 57 S.E.2d 496 (1949).
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order and allow the dispossessory warrant to proceed."
The distinction between general and special demurrers was set out in
the case of Haygood v. Smith' as follows: "A general demurrer enables
the party to assail every substantial imperfection in the pleadings of the
opposite side without particularizing any of them in his demurrer; but if
he thinks proper to point out the faults, this does not vitiate it. A special
demurrer goes to the structure merely, and not to the substance, and it must
distinctly and particularly specify wherein the defect lies."
The special demurrer is still no favorite of the courts, and, during the
last year,'it was again held that reasonable definiteness and certainty in
pleading is all that is required, and factitious demands by special demurrer
are not to be encouraged. 2 The courts are particularly reluctant to sustain special demurrers in equity, due to the board scope of the relief which
may be granted; and it was on one occasion held: "The defenses of multifariousness and duplicity [both of which are reached by special demurrer]
are not favored by courts of equity.""
There are, however, instances of cases in which special demurrers were
held quite proper. For example, failure to attach a contract sued upon to
the petition .or to set it out therein is such a defect as must be taken advantage of by special rather than by general demurrer;"4 and in a case
where the petition refers to a contract as attached and gives it an exhibit
number, whereas the contract is not attached, the overruling of a proper
special demurrer pointing out this fact is error rendering nugatory all
further proceedings. "
DEFENSES

The cases referred to in the next several paragraphs deal primarily with
special defenses, 'i.e., defenses other than a mere confutation of the allegations of the plaintiff, and include the statute of frauds, cross-actions, res
judicata, the statute of limitations, and the like.
As to the statute of frauds, there is one case holding, rather obviously,
that the statute of frauds does not apply to a contract for the sale of land
when the purchase price has been paid and possession delivered. 6 This
case appears to be well within the designated exceptions to the statute."
In the matter of cross-actions, the point which seems to be most frequently in controversy is whether or not the cross-action is germane to the principal action. The rule is concisely stated in Bowles v. W¢hite:68 "New and
60.

Griffin v. Leman, 206 Ga. 116. 56 S.E.2d 263 (1949). The late case of Tyler v.
Eubanks, 207 Ga. 46, 60 S.E.2d 130 (1950) indicates that the ruling would be
different where the subsequent order was passed at the same term of court as the
rulint on the demurrer, since, in such a case, the judgment on demurrer would still
be within the breast of the court.
61. 80 Ga. App. 461, 56 S.E.2d 310 (1949).
62. City of Dalton v. Cochran, 80 Ga. App. 252, 55 S.E.2d 907 (1949).
63. Mankin v. Bryant, 206 Ga. 120, 56 S.E.2d 447 (1949).
64. Garden City Cab Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 80 Ga. App. 850, 57 S.E.2d 683
(1950).
65. Georgia, Ashburn, etc., Ry. Co. v. A.C.L.R. Co., 79 Ga. App. 837, 54 S.E.2d 492
(1949).
66. McKee v. Cartledge, 79 Ga. App. 629, 54 S.E.2d 665 (1949).
67. See GA. CODE § 20-402 (1933).
68. 206 Ga. 343, 57 S.E.2d 187 (1950).
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distinct matters, not involved in the original action, may not be introduced
by cross-action, and a cross action which sets up matters not germane to
the case made by the petition is not maintainable." An excellent application
of this rule is illustrated in a case inwhich the original action was to enjoin trespass to land and to establish a dividing line. A cross-action was
filed wherein the defendant sought to recover damages for the flooding of
certain pasture land other than that referred to in the-main bill. It was held
that the cross-action was not germane, and should have been stricken.69
Where a defendant has a claim against the plaintiff and sets it up by
way of cross-bill or cross-action, he must proceed as thoroughly as though
he had filed an original action; and since the filing of the cross-action constitutes his election of remedy, he is bound by the outcome of the action.
Thus, it was held: "Where the issues presented by the pleadings in a pending suit could have been adjudicated in a former suit between the same
parties, based upon the same cause of action as set up in a cross-action by
the defendant, either under the pleadings there existing or as they could
and should have existed by appropriate amendment thereto, the sustaining
of a general demurrer to such cross-action is res judicata as to the issues
therein set forth, and may be pleaded as a bar to a subsequent action between the same parties as to those issues."
As well might be expected, the defense of res judicata was imposed in a
considerable number of cases. Once a controversy develops, many litigants
appear to be most reluctant to see the end of it, particularly if the result
is unfavorable to themselves. For this reason, courts frequently have to
decide cases on the basis of former adjudication, and occasionally use rather sharp language toward litigious parties and counsel. In the case of
Lankford v. Dockery/' the court set out in a headnote the basic principle
of res judicata as follows: "All questions between parties once a nd finally
settled by a solemn decree must be considered as an end to the litigation.
They cannot be relitigated in other actions, directly or indirectly." In the
body of the case, the court went on to say: "It clearly appears that this
is a conscious effort to ignore several previous judgments and decisions of
this court, and merits only the obsequy which we hope is final."
As a matter of procedure, it may be said that where a defendant files
a plea setting out former adjudication, and attaches a copy of the former
suit and judgment in his favor, such former action being by the same plaintiff and on the same state of facts, the present action will properly be dismissed on such plea."
A judgment rendered in litigation between the same parties is not conclusive in a subsequent suit between them on a different cause of action,
except as to issues actually made and determined in the former litigation. 3
Where such a judgment is pleaded in estoppel, in order for the former decision to be conclusive it must have been based, not merely on purely technical grounds, but at least in part on the merits where under the pleadings
they were or could have been involved." Applying the same rule, res judi69.
70.
71.
72.

Warwick v. Ocean Pond Fishing Club, 206 Ga. 680, 58 S.E.2d 383 (1950).
Mize v. Mize, 80 Ga. App. 441, 56 S.E.2d 121 (1949).
206 Ga. 675, 58 S.E.2d 403 (1950).
Roberts v. Hill, 81 Ga. App. 185, 58 S.E.2d 465 (1950).

73. Merck v. Flynn, 79 Ga. App. 759, 54 S.E.2d 596 (1949).
74. Ibid.
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cata would constitute no defense where the former case was dismissed on
special demurrer without regard to the merits; 5 and where the plea of
res judicata fails to show whether the former judgment was based upon
the merits or upon technical grounds, the plea will properly be dismissed."0
It is also fundamental that the plea of res judicata must not only be
based upon the same cause of action, but the parties, also, must be identical."
Although res judicata and estoppel by judgment are somewhat related
doctrines, they are distinguishable. This was pointed out in the case of
Harvey v. W'Jright,8 wherein it was held: "Under the doctrine of res judicata, whenever there has been a judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction in a former litigation between the same parties, based upon the same
cause of action as the pending litigation, the litigant*s are bound to the extent of all matters put in issue or which under the law might have been put
in issue ...A somewhat different rule applies in regard to the doctrine of
estoppel by judgment, since the latter doctrine has reference to previous
litigation between the same parties based upon a different cause of action."
[Italics supplied.]
Typical examples of cases where res judicata was applied are one in
which it was held that an order awarding custody of a child is res judicata
until a showing is made as to a material change of conditions,7" and another
in which it was held that a boundary line as established in a previous prosessioning procedure is res judicata in an ejectment suit, where the parties
claim from a common grantor, and the essential question is one of boundary.8" The doctrine was held not to apply in a case holding that the fact
that a wife alleged ownership of certain property in her suit for divorce
and alimony, which suit was uncontested by the husband, does not preclude
the husband from bringing a subsequent action to impose a trust upon and
to recover the property on the ground that he placed such property in the
wife's name without the intention to make a gift."
As was pointed out in a previous connection, res judicata may arise from
a judgment on a cross-action as well as from a simple judgment on the main
issue."
The statute of limitations was successfully imposed as a defense in a
suit on a note where the note contained a provision to the effect that it
should become instantly due and payable upon default in any semiannual
interest payment. It was held that the cause of action occurred and the
statute began to run promptly upon the first default in an interest payment,
and that it continued to run, regardless of the fact that interest payments
were made and accepted after such default. It was pointed out in the
case that the provision in the note as to its becoming due and payable upon
default in such payment was absolute. The result would probably have
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Connor v. Bowdoin, 80 Ga. App. 807, 57 S.E.2d 344 (1950).
Story v. Pope, 205 Ga. 523, 54 S.E.2d 394 (1949).
Poorev. Rigsby, 206 Ga. 66, 55 S.E.2d 547 (1949).
80 Ga. App. 232, 55 S.E.2d 835 (1949).
Madison v. Montgomery, 206 Ga. 199, 56 S.E.2d 292 (1949).
Edenfield v. Lanier, 206 Ga. 696, 58 S.E.2d 188 (1950).
Price v. Price, 205 Ga. 623, 54 S.E.2d 578 (1949).
Mize v. Mize, 80 Ga. App. 441, 56 S.E.2d 121 (1949).
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been different had the provision been to make the note due and payable at
the option of the holder upon default."
On the equity side of the court, the defense of laches came into some
use. In Mountain Manor Co. v. Greenoe,84 the general rule as to this defense was set out: "There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches
or staleness of demand, and no one decision constitutes a precedent in the
strict sense for another. Each case is to be determined according to its
own particular circumstances. In other words, the question of laches
is addressed to the sound discretion of the chancellor, and his decision
will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is so clearly wrong as to amount
to an abuse of discretion."
An example of the application of laches was presented in a case in
which suit to set aside the discharge of an executor was filed thirteen years
after discharge. The suit was properly held barred.
COURTS

Since the revision of the practice rules in I946," ; there has been some
confusion as to the effect of the revision upon terms- of court, and the
exact relation of filing the petition and defensive pleadings to terms of
court under our present law. This situation is clarified somewhat in the
case of Henderson v. Henderson.7 In this case, a bill in equity was filed on
May' 25, and service of the same perfected on May 26. Defensive pleadings were filed June 25. The next (July) term of court convened on July
25. On August i, during such July term, the case was called for trial, and
the defendant moved for a continuance on the ground that the case was
not triable at the July term. On the overruling of such motion, he preserved his exceptions, and the case came to the Supreme Court on this
point.
The defendant contended that thirty full days did not elapse between the
appearance day, June 25, and the first day of the term, July 25. The plaintiff's contention was that Code Section 8 1-201 (as amended), prescribing
the thirty-day period, should be construed in the light of Code Section
102-102(8), which controls the computation of periods of time, and that
under this section, either the appearance day or the first day of term should
be counted as one of the days of the period.
In its holding, the court set forth as pertinent that portion of Code Section 81-201 which reads as follows: ". . . If the period of time between
the appearance day of a case and the day on which the next regular term
of court is scheduled by law to begin is 3 o days or more, the same shall be
,s"88
deemed to be returnable to that term .
The court then proceeded to say that the important word in the above
quoted passage is "between," and that the section should be so construed
as to require thirty full days between the appearance day and the first
83. Barnwell v. Hanson, 80 Ga. App. 738, 57 S.E.2d 348 (1950).
84. 205 Ga. 619, 54 S.E.2d 629 (1949).
85. Warnock v. Warnock, 206 Ga. 548, 57 S.E.2d 571 (1950).
86. Ga. Laws 1946, p. 761.
87. 206 Ga. 23, 55 S.E.2d 578 (1949).
88. GA. CODE ANN. § 81-201 (Supp. 1947).
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day of term, without counting either of such days in the computation. The
contentions of the defendant were therefore correct, and the holding of
the lower court was reversed on the ground that only twenty-nine days had
elapsed between the return day and the beginning of the term.
There was another case involving terms of court, in which a party filed
an affidavit of illegality less than twenty days before the beginning of
the January term. A demurrer was filed to the affidavit, and a hearing was
set during the January term. The party filing the affidavit then objected to
such hearing at the January term, and contended that the matter should
go over to the March term under Code Section 8x-I 1i, which was unaffected by the 1946 revision insofar as affidavits of illegality are concerned."9
This Code section relates to the filing of petitions twenty days before the
first day of the term. The court held, however, that the hearing of affidavits of illegality is controlled by Code Section 39-oo6, which provides for
a hearing at the first term, and that under the circumstances, the hearing
was properly held at the January term."°
In the matter of the jurisdiction of courts, there was a holding to the effect that wages of persons who reside out of this state and which have been
earned wholly without this state are subject to garnishment in this state,
even though the case is not brought by writ of attachment."1
In several cases the jurisdictional question turned upon whether or not
the action involved title to land. In one case it was adjudged that the issue as to the location of a land line arising out of a processioning proceeding does not involve title to land."2 In another it was held that an action
in trover will lie to recover physical possession of a deed to land, and that
where such action is purely for possession, and not an attempt to compel
an original delivery of the deed, the action does not involve title to land.""
A rather important holding relating to venue of actions was presented
in the case of Georgia Power Co. v. Blum." It was there adjudged that
the rule that an action will lie against joint tort-feasors in the county of
the residence of either applies with equal effect where one of the tortfeasors is an electric company, and that this constitutes a modification of
the rule contained in Code Section 94-1 1oi, requiring suits against electric
companies to be brought in the county in which the injury occured.
As to the power of courts to punish for contempt, one of the most interesting cases decided during the last several years was that of Kenimer
v. State. 5 The case arose out of the fact that a husband and father, who
had not been awarded custody of a minor child in a divorce action, took
possession of the child during a visit and wrongfully removed her from
the jurisdiction of the court, retaining such wrongful possession for a
period of two hundred and thirty-eight days, at the end of which time. he
returned with her to the jurisdiction. The solicitor general brought citation
for contempt, charging each of the two hundred and thirty-eight days of
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

See GA. CODE ANN. § 81-1506 (Supp. 1947).
McLendon v. Lemon, 79 Ga. App. 751, 54 S.E.2d 424 (1949).
Southern Ry. Co. v. Coleman, 80 Ga. App. 227, 55 S.E.2d 825 (1949).
Ledford v. Hill, 206 Ga. 304, 57 S.E.2d 77 (1950).
Breen v. Barfield, 80 Ga. App. 615, 56 S.E.2d 791 (1949).
80 Ga. App. 618, 57 S.E.2d 18 (1949).
81 Ga. App. 437, 59 S.E. 296 (1950).
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wrongful possession as a separate contemptious act. Defendant demurred to such charge, but when an unfavorable ruling was rendered on his
demurrer, failed to preserve his exceptions. The ruling on the demurrer,
therefore, became the law of the case, and the opportunity to test whether
or not each day could be treated as a separate contempt. was lost. The
court, after a hearing, imposed a fine of $11,9oo and ordered the defendant
confined to the county jail for five days on each count, the total time amounting to more than three years. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed
the lower court, holding that the cumulative effect of such a sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment within the constitutional meaning. This
decision appears to be subject to some criticism in that it lays down no
specific rule as to how such a contempt as was here dealt with can be punished. It is also unfortunate that the court was not able to render a positive
holding as to whether the act of the defendant was actually one contempt
or a series of contemptious acts. However, from a humanitarian point of
view the decision is probably just, and although the court does not specifically say so, it would appear that the punishment of multiple contempts
must lie somewhat within the discretion of the trial court, the judge having the obligation to see that the Constitution is not violated."
In one other case involving a question of contempt, it was ruled that
where in a processioning procedure, the losing party erects a fence on land
adjudicated to belong to the other party, his action renders him a trespasser, but does not constitute a contempt of court:9
EXTRAORDINARY RIEMEDIES AT LAW

In one of the several cases decided which involve the writ of mandamus,
it was again clearly stated that this remedy is never available where the
petitioning party has access to another remedy. Thus, where one was denied a pension by the board of trustees of a police pension fund, and the
adverse decision of such board could have been reviewed by certiorari, a
writ of mandamus will not lie to compel payment of a pension by the
board. 8
A good example of a case in which mandamus was held proper was an
instance where the petitioner had applied to a city for a building permit,
and it was refused, the only reason for such refusal being an unconstitutional zoning ordinance of the city. Petitioner could, in the same action,
compel the issuance of the permit and attack the constitutionality of the
ordinance."
The writ of mandamus will never be granted unless a clear legal right
to it is shown. Where a petitioner sought a certificate from an ordinary,
.,nd the ordinary issued a certificate which for all legal purposes was suffi,cent, the petitioner could not, by mandamus, compel the issuance of a
certificate in the exact terms desired by him."'
Ordinarily, the superior court has power to punish a single act of contempt by a
fine not exceeding $200 and by imprisonment not exceeding 20 days. GA. CODE §
24-2615(5) (1933).
97. Cagle v. Patterson, 80 Ga. App. 865, 57 S.E.2d 509 (1950).
98. Densmore v. West, 206 Ga. 531, 57 S.E.2d 675 (1950).
99. City of Pearson v. The Glidden Co., 205 Ga. 738, 55 S.E.2d 125 (1949).
100. Powell, Ordinary v. Hansard, 206 Ga. 505, 57 S.E.2d 677 (1950).
96.
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Allegations in a petition to compel the resignation of a state officer by
mandamus were insufficient to state a cause of action, even though they
declared that he was engaging in activities forbidden to a holder of his
office, where the statute forbidding such activities contained no penalty and
nowhere provided for any forfeiture of the office on disobedience of its
terms."'
As a matter of procedure, the defendant in a-mandamus proceeding may
quite properly question the validity of the law which it is being sought to
compel him to obey by means of a demurrer to the petition." 2
As we have just seen, mandamus will not compel the resignation of a
state officer engaging in forbidden activities. The same rule applies where
the same result is sought by quo warranto. Thus, it was held that where
a statute provides that a public officer shall engage in no business other
than that of his office, but is silent as to any penalty or disqualification, tile
fact that he does engage in other occupations is no grounds for quo warranto.103
Although not strictly relating to the remedy of quo warranto, one rather
interesting rule was established in a quo warranto proceeding. It was
sought to inquire into the right of a sheriff to hold his office, on the ground
that he had not been a resident of the county for the statutory period required. The defendant contended that he had complied with the residence
requirements in that he became a resident of the county while in the armed
forces, although he was not physically present in the county. He further
showed that he caused his household effects to be moved to his father's
home in the county at such time. It was held that his title to the office was
good, since a soldier has. as much right to change his residence as another,
even though his duties require his physical presence elsewhere.""
EQUITY

During the period of this survey, several cases were decided which
dealt with equitable principles and the distinctions between law and equity.
In the Court of Appeals, for instance, it was adjudicated that where one
partner bought the assets of a deceased partner upon his death, and later
found from the books that such deceased partner had overdrawn partnership funds, this afforded no basis for an action at law against the personal
representative of the deceased partner."' The same case further held that
although a suit for money had and received is a legal action, it is founded
upon the equitable principle that no one ought unjustly to enrich himself at
the expense of another; thus, it is a substitute for a suit in equity."'
It was also held in the Court of Appeals that a money rule is in the
nature of an equitable proceeding and is to be determined in accordance
with equitable proceedings.0 7
As was pointed out previously in the discussion of parties, where addi101.
102.
103.

McLendon v. Wilburn, 206 Ga. 646, 58 S.E.2d 423 (1950).
Franklin v. Harper, 205 Ga. 779, 55 S.E.2d 221 (1949).
Turner v. Wilburn, 206 Ga. 149, 56 S.E.2d 285 (1949).

104. Engram v. Faircloth, 205 Ga. 577, 54 S.E.2d 598 (1949).
105. Davis v. Holloway, 81 Ga. App. 158, 58 S.E.2d 234 (1950).
106. Id. at 162, 58 S.E.2d at 237.
107. Harvey v. Wright, 80 Ga. App. 232, 55 S.E.2d 835 (1949).
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tional parties are added to an original suit in equity, there must be service
upon such parties if they are defendants, and some reasonable opportunity
for a hearing must be afforded before any order affecting them is passed.
Failure of such service and opportunity for hearing will render the order
invalid." 8
On the qustion of quia timet, it was held that while as a general rule
in order for a plaintiff to maintain an equitable petition to remove a cloud
upon his title he must show actual possession in himself, there are exceptions to this rule, such as where there is a distinct head of equity jurisdiction sufficient to support the action, as where deeds are obtained by fraud
or other illegal means or a prayer for a decree of title in the petitioner is
contained in the petition.'
As to venue and jurisdiction of parties in equity, the rule in cases where
there are resident and nonresident defendants joined in the action, and
where judgment is rendered in favor of the resident but against the nonresident, is similar to the rule at law." ' That is to say, the judgment against
the nonresident cannot stand, and upon proper motion will be arrested."'
Moreover, where such a motion has been made, the court loses jurisdiction of the nonresident defendant; and where no proper motion was made
by the112plaintiff, the grant of a new trial as to all defendants would be
error.

As to a bill of interpleader, it was indicated that relief of this type is
to be granted only in those cases where the plaintiff actually has no way
of telling which of two or more conflicting claims he has to honor. In other
words, there must be some controversy between the claimants which requires adjudication, and which would make it dangerous for the plaintiff
to honor either claim without regard to the other. Therefore where a petition for interpleader shows on its face that while there are two claimants
for a fund, one of the claims is without any legal justification or basis,
no cause for relief is stated, since the petitioner can well determine which
claim to honor."' Of course, in a case of this sort the plaintiff is practically
as well off as if the relief had been granted, since the holding is in the
nature of an adjudication that one of the claims is bad. The same rule will
apply in a case where both of the claims are good. For instance, where a
safety deposit box was rented to a husband and wife jointly with the
stipulation that either might enter it upon the decease of the husband,
either the wife or the administrator of the husband had a right to enter
the box. The bank renting the box, therefore, would not have been liable,
regardless of who took the contents of the box. This was not, therefore, a
proper subject for relief by interpleader."'
108. Fitzpatrick v. Bloodworth, 205 Ga. 366, 53 S.E.2d 917 (1949).
109. Burton v. Hart, 206 Ga. 87, 55 S.E.2d 593 (1949).
110. For the rule in cases at law, see Burger v. Noble, 81 Ga. App. 759, 59 S.E.2d 761
(1950). This case holds that the non-resident is entitled to a motion in arrest of
judgment upon the release of his resident co-defendant; however, if the non-resident moves for a new trial upon the merits of the case, this will constitute a waiver
of his jurisdictional objections.
111. Ryner v. Duke, 206 Ga. 408, 57 S.E.2d 171 (1950).
112. Ibid. F or the earlier history of this case, see Ryner v.. Duke, 205 Ga. 280 53 S.E.2d
362 (1949).
113. Reed v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 206 Ga. 604, 58 S.E.2d 183 (1950).
114. Mandeville v. First Natl. Bank, 206 Ga. 426, 57 S.E.2d 553 (1950).

19501

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

167

Injunctions, restraining orders and the procedure for the enforcement
of such orders came into considerable play, particularly in the field of labor
law. It appears that there are two rules as to the punishment for a violation of these orders: Where the violation is purely civil in nature, its effect
is extinguished by a settlement of the case. Where, on the other hand, the
violation is criminal or quasi-criminal in nature, the settlement of the civil
case out of which it arose does not extinguish it or render the violator free
from punishment.11
DOMEsTic RELATIONS

The General Assembly, at the i95o session, passed an act which substantially changed one portion of the procedure for adoption of children.""
The effect of this statute is to modify the procedure for adoption by providing that, after a decree of a superior court has been entered ordering
the father of a child to support it and he has failed to do so for twelve
months after such order, the consent of such father to the adoption is no
longer required, the consent of the mother being sufficient.
The most important legislative development in divorce procedure was
the reduction of the required period of residence necessary
for a petitioner
7
to secure a divorce from twelve months to six months."

One rather interesting feature of divorce practice that has concerned
the courts in recent months is the matter of actions for divorce where one
or the other of the parties is insane. Of course, since divorce is a personal
action, it has long been established that an insane person cannot maintain
the action as plaintiff, whether through next friend or otherwise.' Where,
however, the plaintiff is sane and the defendant is insane, the mere insanity of such defendant at the time of filing the suit will not defeat
the action. "'
It should be noted, however, that where an action for divorce is contemplated against one whose sanity is in question, regardless of whether
there has been an actual adjudication of insanity, care should be exercised2
to comply with the law as to service upon persons non compos mentiS1 '1
As was held in the case of Chambers v. Chambers :121 "A person who is non
compos mentis, though not legally adjudged to be an insane person, is incapable of being served with a petition for divorce; and a judgment in an
115.

116.
117.
118.
119.

120.
121.

Aired v. Celanese Corp., 205 Ga. 371, 54 S.E.2d 240 (1949). For a rather interesting study of the use of the restraining order and injunction in a troubled labor
situation, a reading of the "Celanese" eases would be rewarding. In addition to
the above cited case, see also Pedigo v. Celanese Corp., 205 Ga. 392, 54 S.E.2d 252
(1949) ; Womack v. Celanese Corp., 205 Ga. 514, 54 S.E.2d 235 (1949) ;Alred v.
Celanese Corp., 205 Ga. 499, 54 S.E.2d 225 (1949) ; Carroll v. Celanese Corp., 205
Ga. 493, 54 S.E.2d 221 (1949).
Ga. Laws 1950, p. 289, amending GA. CODE ANN. § 74-404 (1946 Rev.).
Ga. Laws 1950, p. 429, amending GA. CODE § 30-107 (1933).
See Phillips v. Phillips, 203 Ga. 106, 45 S.E.2d 621 (1947), citing Worthy v.
Huguley v. Huguley, 204 Ga. 692, 51 S.E.2d 445 (1949). Note, however, that in
order for the divorce to be granted, the grounds must have arisen prior to the
insanity of the defendant. See Zeigler v. Zeigler, 149 Ga. 508, 101 S.E. 183 (1919).
Worthy, 36 Ga. 45, 91 Am. Dec. 758 (1867).
For method, see Scott v. Winningham, 79 Ga. 492, 4 S.E. 390 (1887).
206 Ga. 796, 58 S.E.2d 814 (1950).
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uncontested divorce suit which is predicated upon such service may be set
aside in a proceeding by a next friend." It appears that the fault of the
petition in the Chambers case was mainly in improper service; although
that case does not cite the case of Huyuley v. Hu guley, 2' the Huguley
case is of very recent authority, holding that there is no law preventing
a husband from suing his insane wife for divorce upon grounds of cruelty
inflicted prior to her insanity. The court here ruled: (after referring to
cases holding that an insane person cannot maintain a divorce action
through a guardian) that such reasoning does not apply in a case where
the petitioner is sane but the defendant is insane. "The petitioner has the
right to make his choice as to whether or not he shall condone or seek a
divorce and the condition of his spouse at the time of such decision cannot affect this right of the petitioner any more than if it were a suit on
any other contract."
It is hoped that most of the confusion incident to the effect of the "thirty
day rule" on appellate procedure in divorce actions has now been resolved.
However, the case of WIinn v. Winn,' 3 decided just prior to the beginning
of the period here surveyed, appears to justify comment in that it is typical
of the cases which caused the trouble and to give a brief historical summary
of the matter. Although the history as to the procedure and the various
pleadings filed in the Winn case is quite complicated, the holdings in the
case fall well within the pattern that has been set in cases of this sort:
a motion for new trial after the grant of a divorce which is not based upon
a hearing on an application to set aside a verdict and decree is a mere
nullity, and neither party has a right to a grant of such motion; and, where
the application to set aside the verdict is dismissed on demurrer, the only
remedy is by a direct bill of exceptions filed within twenty days after the
ruling on demurrer. Exceptions pendente lite taken pending an improper
motion for new trial will not suffice, and the bill of exceptions will be dismissed if not presented within the requisite twenty days after the sustaining of the demurrer.
That part of the [Winn case to which attention is especially invited is the
well-taken dissent of Justice Atkinson. After pointing out that he has consistently dissented in cases of this sort, Justice Atkinson says: "As I interpret the mode of procedure to review divorce trials as set forth in the
foregoing cases, we have entered into a realm of procedure hitherto unknown to the law, contrary to established modes of procedure, impregnated
with innovations, and so intricate and complicated as to cause endless confusion to the bench and bar. Such procedure has modified and curtailed
a litigant's rights under Code § 70-ioI et seq., relating generally to motions for new trial, § 30-130, specifically relating to new trials in divorce
cases, and is contrary to § 110-701 et seq., relating to the arrest and setting aside of judgments . . . It is inconceivable that this act [Georgia Laws
1946, p. 90 et seq.] be construed so as to give a legislative intent to abolish
a simple and well-established procedure under which we have operated since
122. 204 Ga. 692, 51 S.E.2d 445 (1949).
123. 205 Ga. 314, 53 S.E.2d 477 (1949). See Powell v. Powell, 207 Ga. 1, 59 S.E.2d 718
(1950), holding that while the petition to modify or set aside must be filed within
30 days after the grant of the divorce, it may thereafter be amended.

19501

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

the establishment of this court, and, by implication, substitute procedure
which, so far as the writer knows, is unknown to any system of jurisprudence."
While it is probably too late for the condition pointed out in this dissent
to be corrected by judicial interpretation, an excellent field for remedial
legislation seems to be indicated for someone with the influence and technical ability to improve the situation.
The case of Carnegie v. Carnegie"4 reiterated the holding that one
against whom a divorce has been granted is not entitled as a matter of
right to a rehearing upon the filing of a petition therefor within thirdy
days; and unless the petition shows a good legal cause for further hearing,
it is subject to be dismissed. This case discounted as obitur dictum certain
language in the cases of Thompson v. Thompson"' and Dugas v.Dugas,'"
which might have been construed to the contrary.
Where the action is for divorce and alimony, the verdict must be consistent. Thus, where prayers for alimony are dependent upon the incident
to those for divorce, a verdict and judgment denying a divorce but granting alimony cannot stand, and such a judgment can be modified
by the court
12 7
on its own motion at the term at which it was rendered.
There was one case which, while it did not authorize divorce by consent,
held that the separation of the parties might be by consent in proper instances. It was ruled that the charge, "I charge you that, if the separation
in this case was by mutual consent of the parties, or was caused by the misconduct of the plaintiff, then you would not be authorized to grant a divorce," was incorrect in that it excluded from the jury the possibility that
the separation may properly have been agreed upon as the result of cruel
treatment."8
Although personal service is necessary in order to secure a valid judgment for alimony, such service can be properly made by serving the conusel
of record for a party while the case is pending."'
In the matter of custody of minors, it was held that the principle of res
judicata applies to decrees for such custody in the absence of a change of
conditions, and that the discretion of the trial judge will not be controlled
unless abused. 3 ° The rule as to the discretion of the trial judge is of particular application in those cases where both contending parties are of
equal fitness."'
Where the action for custody is brought by habeas corpus procedure,
it does not matter how the defendant obtained possession of the minor,
whether by decree, by natural means or by some other type of taking. The
fact that he has physical custody is sufficient to support the action."1
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

206 Ga. 77, 55 S.E.2d 583 (1949).
203 Ga. 128, 45 S.E.2d 632 (1947).
201 Ga. 190, 39 S.E.2d 658 (1946).
Davis v. Davis, 206 Ga. 559, 57 S.E.2d 673 (1950).
Levine v. Levine, 206 Ga. 234, 56 S.E.2d 266 (1949).
Brewer v. Brewer, 206 Ga. 93, 55 S.E.2d 593 (1949).
Madison v. Montgomery, 206 Ga. 199, 56 S.E.2d 292 (1949).
Crawford v. Jones, 205 Ga. 764, 55 S.E.2d 215 (1949).
Walker v. Steele, 206 Ga. 674, 58 S.E.2d 421 (1950).
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DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS

The courts are still, quite properly, strict in requiring a genuine justiciable controversy before granting a declaratory judgment. However, during the past year there seems to have been some modification, particularly
by the Supreme Court, of the rigid requirements set out in the earliest
cases. It was held that a petition seeking a declaratory judgment, which
fails to show a justiciable controversy is subject to demurrer, and that a
court will not grant such relief where the contentions are based upon an
action already pending in another court and where the declaration, if
granted, would be in the nature of an advisory opinion to another court.'33
The justiciable controversy rule was further applied in a case in which
a bonding company brought suit against the beneficiary under a guardian's
bond, wherein the bonding company alleged that the beneficiary was asserting that the company was liable on a bond in a larger amount than was the
case. The court held that this was a matter which could easily be adjudicated without additional risk to the company when and if an action was
brought on the bond." 4
On the other hand, it was held that after a reconciliation subsequent to
an alimony decree, a husband, who had been informed by his wife that she
still understood the alimony decree to be in effect, was entitled to a
declaratory judgment to establish his property rights.1"
It was further held that an action for a declaratory judgment could
properly be maintained by an insurance company to determine whether it
was liable to defend an insured under a liability policy, where such insured
had exceeded
and violated the terms of the policy and had incurred lia1 ,,
bility. '
There was an additional case wherein a municipality, ultra vires its
charter, was attempting to levy a tax upon percentages of sales of theatre
tickets in addition to other license fees. A declaratory judgment was held
to lie in favor of one contemplating going into the moving picture business,
even though he had not opened his theatre at the time of the suit, since
it would not be just to allow him to take the risk of going into a business
which could be rendered unprofitable because of an illegal tax."'
PRACTICE IN COURT OF ORDINARY

At the last session, the General Assembly enacted two measures which
relate to proceedings regarding insane persons. These acts will affect the
practice in the court of ordinary to some degree.
The first of these provisions"' amended Code Section 49-604, relating
to the examination as to the capacity of one alleged to be insane to manage
his estate, by striking from that section the requirement that after notice
133. Darnell v. Tate, 206 Ga. 576, 58 S.E.2d 160 (1950).
134. Tucker v. American Surety Company of New York, 206 Ga. 533, 57 S.E.2d 662
(1950). See also Sanders v. Harlem Baptist Church, 207 Ga. 7, 59 S.E.2d 720
(1950).
135. Wright v. Wright, 205 Ga. 524, 54 S.E.2d 596 (1949).
136. Wallace v. Virginia Surety Co., 80 Ga. App. 50, 55 S.E.2d 259 (1949).
137. Publix-Lucas Theatres v. City of Brunswick, 206 Ga. 206, 56 S.E.2d 254 (1949).
138. Ga. Laws 1950, p. 14.
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of the application to have a guardian appointed, one of the relatives (or
other persons notified in accordance with the section) must make an
affidavit to the effect that the alleged insane person is, in fact, insane and
likely to do himself injury.
The other provision.. amended Code Section 49-612, relating to proceedings by third persons looking to the confinement of an insane ward.
The effect of this amendment is to permit the. temporary confinement of
insane persons in places other than the county jail pending transmission
to the state hospital, and to make the sheriff of the county responsible for
the safeguarding of the person so confined.
With relation to another matter within the jurisdiction of the court
of ordinary, it was held that the requisite notice by a widow that she
intends to apply for a year's support may be given by her attorney. "'
TRIALS AND HEARING

As was pointed out in the remarks relating to demurrers, since the adoption of the Constitution of 1945, the judges of the superior courts may,
on reasonable notice to the parties, at any time, in vacation or at chambers, hear and determine by interlocutory or final judgment, any matter
or issue, where a jury is not required or Where it may be waived."' This
provision has been held to mean that a hearing, such as that upon general
demurrer, can be held even before the appearance day of the case if there
2
are enough pleadings before the court to enable it to reach a decision.'1
The courts continue to adhere to the fundamental rule that in order to
insist upon his rights, a party must envoke them at the proper time and
insist upon their preservation in the record. Thus, a motion for new trial
on the ground that the attorney for the moving party was too ill to attend'
properly to his duties during the first trial will not lie where no motion
for mistrial was made upon the discovery of his condition. In other words,
the moving party cannot wait to see what the verdict will be, and then,
when disappointed, move for another trial on such grounds. "'"
A somewhat similar rule is that which requires a party wishing to raise
a constitutional question to do so in the original trial or hearing, rather
than to raise it for the first time in a procedure seeking a review."' It is
not necessary that the attack up~on the constitutionality of a law be made
at the first hearing relating to the matter at issue, but it must be made at
the first
reasonable opportunity after the constitutional question enters the
4
case.

The right of a plaintiff to dismiss his action is recognized in Trusco
Finance Co. v. McGee, "' wherein it was held that where a plaintiff in a bail
trover action dismisses such action with no affirmative defense having been
filed, it is error for the court, on defendant's motion, to reinstate the action
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Ga. Laws 1950, p. 30.
Carroll v. Hill, 80 Ga. App. 576, 56 S.E.2d 821 (1949).
GA. CONST. Art VI, § 4, f 8, GA. CODE ANN. § 2-3908 (1948 Rev.).
Reardon v. Bland, 206 Ga. 633, 58 S.E.2d 377 (1950).
Stanfill v. Hiers, 80 Ga. App. 874, 57 S.E.2d 851 (1950).
See Galfas v. Ailor, 206 Ga. 76, 55 S.E.2d 582 (1949).
Burke v. State, 205 Ga. 520, 54 S.E.2d 348 (1949).
206 Ga. 382, 57 S.E.2d 184 (1949).
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and enjoin the plaintiff from proceeding with a similar action against a
third party in another court.
Although a case voluntarily dismissed may be reinstated or refiled under
proper circumstances, a somewhat different rule applies to cases dismissed
for want of prosecution. While a court has plenary control of its orders
and judgments at the term at which they are rendered, it is an abuse of
discretion to reinstate a case after its dismissal for want of prosecution,
where no reason for the plaintiff's failure to appear is shown.'47
A number of cases terminated in nonsuits during the survey period; and,
although nothing new with reference to this subject was added, there are
a few cases which merit consideration. The case of Fuller v. Still.. contains
a very good general review of the law of nonsuit.
It is axiomatic that the grant of a motion for nonsuit is error where
there is evidence which would authorize any of the relief prayed for by
the plaintiff.' This is illustrated by a case in which a prospective purchaser brought an action for damages for non-conveyance and for specific
performance against the owner of land, and joined therein a real estate
.agent to whom he had made payments upon his commission. The real estate
agent tendered the commissions into court, but a nonsuit was granted on
the basis of the fact that the plaintiff had made out no case against the
land owner. This was error, since the plaintiff was entitled to the commissions tendered.5 0
The grant of a nonsuit is error where it appears that the plaintiff proved
his case as laid, unless the plaintiff's evidence itself disproves his right to
recover by establishing the existence of other undisputed defensive facts
showing that he is not entitled to recover.'
As to procedure after the grant of a nonsuit or the refusal to make such
grant, it was held that where such motion is granted and a motion to reinstate is filed on the basis of evidence wrongfully excluded, the failure to
set out the alleged wrongfully excluded evidence literally or in substance
in such motion results in no question being raised for adjudication in an
appellate court."52
When exceptions are taken to a failure to grant a nonsuit and, later, a
motion for new trial is made on the general ground, and such motion is
overruled, the question of the refusal to grant a nonsuit merges into the
question of failure to grant the new trial. That is to say, the basic question in both motions is that of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
verdict."'
In accordance with a long line of decisions of the appellate courts, it
was ruled that the denial of a motion for nonsuit is not a proper ground
for a motion for new trial, but may be reviewed only by a direct bill of
exceptions."'
147.
148.
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150.
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Drain Tile Machine, Inc. v. McCannon, 80 Ga. App. 373, 56 S.E.2d 165 (1949).
79 Ga. App. 803, 54 S.E.2d 698 (1949).
McCurry v. Moffett, 80 Ga. App. 761, 57 S.E.2d 451 (1950).
Harris v. Underwood, 206 Ga. 243, 56 S.E.2d 287 (1949).
Gilley v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 81 Ga. App. 71, 58 S.E.2d 218 (1950).
Butler v. Hazelrigs, 205 Ga. 425, 54 S.E.2d 266 (1949).
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Singletary, 80 Ga. App. 297, 55 S.E.2d 827
(1949) ; Brannen v. Bowen, 81 Ga. App. 430, 59 S.E.2d 7 (1950).
154. Hamel v. Elliott, 79 Ga. App. 633, 54 S.E.2d 688 (1949).
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Worthy of mention are a few cases relating to juries. Perhaps the case
of greatest interest on the matter of disqualification of jurors is that of
Taturn v. State.' In this case the defendant was indicted for murder; and,
as feeling in the community was very sympathetic toward the victim, several
contribution lists were circulated for citizens of the county to sign. Certain of these lists showed contributions "to the family of the deceased,"
while others showed contributions for the purpose of employing special
counsel to aid the solicitor general in the prosecution of the crime. On the
trial, motion was made by the defense to have the jury purged as to relationship to all persons whose names appeared on these lists. The motion
was overruled. On appeal, it was held that there was no error in overruling the motion as to jurors related to persons who had merely made
contributions to the family of the deceased. However, those persons contributing to the employment of special counsel were voluntary prosecutors, and jurors related to them within the prohibited degrees were inelligible to serve. For this reason the decision was reversed.
In a civil case referring to the matter of relationship of jurors to parties,
it was ruled that where the verdict was demanded by the evidence no new
trial would be granted, regardless of such relationship.'
It was held that whether or not he will permit a poll of the jury is
discretionary with the judge in civil cases, and that where a poll is permitted, it may be taken immediately after the reading of the verdict."'
The losing party in this case made the rather remarkable contention that,
although the poll was taken on his motion, it was done at the wrong timethat it should have been taken before the verdict was read in order that
the jurors would not be influenced by the reading of the verdict and embarrassed in stating a contrary intention. Although the right to move for
a poll is the prerogative of the losing party, the movant here failed to
explain how the losing party could be determined before the reading of
the verdict.
The arguments and conduct of counsel in trial courts presented several
questions for review. It was held that counsel can argue all matter which
remains in the record, even though testimony commented upon may have
been improperly admitted; and the remarks made upon such testimony
prior to any motion to strike it are no ground for mistrial."8
One who feels that the remarks of opposing counsel are improper must
take the proper steps to correct the matter. Mere criticism of such remarks not couched as an objection is insufficient to envoke any ruling of
the court.'" However, when improper argument is made by counsel, counsel for the opposite party, in order to make the action of the judge in
reference to the same the basis for a review, may object to the argument
and rest simply on that objection; and if the court fails to take any notice
of the objection and allows the argument to proceed, this conduct may be
reviewed.""
155.
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159.
160.

206 Ga. 171, 56 S.E.2d 518 (1949).
Hickox v. Griffin, 205 Ga. 849, 55 S.E.2d 351 (1949).
Pan-American Wall Paper Co. v. Tudor, 81 Ga. App. 417, 59 S.E.2d 12 (1950).
Hotel Dempsey Co. v. Miller, 81 Ga. App. 233, 58 S.E.2d 475 (1950).
Caldwell v. Brown, 80 Ga. App. 858, 57 S.E.2d 618 (1950).
Johns v. State, 79 Ga. App. 429, 54 S.E.2d 142 (1949), citing Southern Ry. Co.
v. Brown, 126 Ga. 1, 54 S.E. 911 (1906).
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Certainly no phase of trial practice is more important than the charge
to the jury, and while the basic principles involved are quite well-established, the details of one case vary so greatly from those of another that the
courts are kept constantly deciding whether a particular charge was necessitated, justified or permissible under a given set of facts. Of course, a
great body of cases go to the appellate courts on the question of whether
a charge states a correct principle of law. No effort will be made here to
deal with any substantial number of these cases, since the questions generally fall within one of several fields of substantive law. The questions which
concern us at this time are those as to whether a charge is correct
in form, whether it should have been given under the circumstances (regardless of the correctness of the legal proposition stated) and what the
effect of a charge is as a matter of procedure.
An incorrect charge does not always constitute reversible error. Not
only do we have the many cases in which the error is rendered harmless
by virtue of the fact that it is more favorable to the complaining party
than to this opponent, but, since the fundamental purpose of adjudication
is, after all, to establish justice rather than to operate the courts according
to arbitrary rules, we have the doctrine that no new trial will be granted because of an erroneous charge if the verdict was demanded by the evidence.'
Where possible, the courts will look to the substance of a charge rather
than the form. Thus, where a charge clearly indicated that a verdict might
be found for the plaintiff, it was not error to fail to give to the jury an
exact form for such verdict.'62 Further, a mere slip of the tongue by the
court or the misuse of a word will constitute no cause for reversal where
the whole charge lays down a correct principle of law.1"3 For instance, the
omission of the word "not" from a charge will not necessarily work a
reversal, certainly where the error is more favorable to the complaining party than to his adversary.'64
It is, on the other hand, highly important to see that the jury is not and
cannot be confused by the charge. It has, therefore, been held reversible
error to charge upon the contentions of parties when such contentions are
supported by no evidence, unless it is apparent that the jury could not have
been thereby misled." 5 It is also error to place upon a party a burden
which he has not assumed. Under this rule it was held that where a court
charged upon the general authority of an agent to act for his principal,
where no question of agency had been raised, either by the pleadings or
by evidence, the charge was not merely superfluous but was erroneous,
since to place the defendant in a false and losing position as to one issue
might well discredit his position as to other issues.' 66
Another type of charge which sometimes results in a reversal is that
which undertakes to charge upon a subject and, although it contains no
error of law, is simply not complete. As an example, while it is not general161.
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Hickox v. Griffin, 205 Ga. 849, 55 S.E.2d 351 (1949).
Haywood v. Mathis, 81 Ga. App. 187, 58 S.E.2d 209 (1950).
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Bailey, 81 Ga. App. 20, 57 S.E.2d 837 (1950).
Hotel Dempsey Co. v. Miller, 81 Ga. App. 233, 58 S.E.2d 475 (1950).
Nelson v1.Huber & Huber Express, Inc., 79 Ga. App. 721, 54 S.E.2d 462 (1949).
MeJenkin Insurance Co. v. Thompson, 79 Ga.App. 473, 54 S.E.2d 336 (1949).
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ly necessary that a court charge on the preponderance of evidence, where it
undertakes to do so the charge must be complete; and where one of the
elements of determination of the preponderance is omitted, such as the
consideration of all the facts and circumstances in the case, the remainder
of the charge, although correct so far as it goes, is error.16
As to the necessity for a request for charge, it was held that there is no
error in failing to charge upon the impeachment of witnesses in the absence
of a request;IC8 and the same rule applies to failing to charge that proof of
an attestation clause shifts the burden of showing no execution of a will to
the Caveator.169
The assignment of error on a charge believed to be erroneous must be
specific and must show the exact objection taken. It was held, for instance,
that an assignment of error upon the charge as a whole, wherein it is contended that the charge was "argumentative," "confusing," and "misleading" by reason of quoted exerpts was too general and indefinite to be considered by an appellate court. 7 °
VERDICT AND JUDGMENT

The majority of questions relating to verdicts decided by the appellate
courts during the past year dealt with directed verdicts; and while the
principles set forth are quite well-established, they probably justify some
comment because of the fact that they are constantly being carried up for
adjudication. It was again emphatically pointed out that the direction of
a verdict is error where there is some material conflict in the evidence. 171
On the other hand, the court in the case of Mize v. Paschall" quoted
Code Section iIO-iO4: "Where there is no conflict in the evidence, and
that introduced, with all reasonable deductions or inferences therefrom,
shall demand a particular verdict, the court may direct the jury to find for
the party entitled thereto." The court then went on to say, "In other
words, there is no error in directing a verdict which is the inevitable and
only legal result of the pleadings and evidence."
Where a party feels that a verdict has been improperly directed against
him, it is important that he except specifically to the direction of the verdict rather than merely move for a new trial on the general grounds. This
is true because the decision of the trial court in directing a verdict will be
reversed if there is any evidence which might have resulted in a verdict
for the aggrieved party; whereas, generally, a verdict will not be reversed
on the general grounds if there is any evidence to sustain it. The courts
have repeatedly held that where a verdict is directed and the losing party
excepts to the overruling of his motion for a new trial, but does not complain of the direction of the verdict, the reviewing court will consider, in
Southern Ry. Co. v. Florence, 81 Ga. App. 1, 57 S.E.2d 856 (1950).
Stone v. State, 80 Ga. App. 557, 56 S.E.2d 835 (1949).
Middleton v. Waters, 205 Ga. 847, 55 S.E.2d 359 (1949).
Ibid.
Norris v. Coffee, 206 Ga. 759, 58 S.E.2d 812 (1950). See also Williams v. Williams,
206 Ga. 395, 57 S.E.2d 337 (1950).
172. 206 Ga. 189, 56 S.E.2d 266 (1949).
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
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this connection, only the question as to whether the verdict is supported by
the evidence. "3
Although an auditor's report is not actually a verdict, it might be proper
at this time to refer to one case involving this type of finding, wherein it
was held that a motion for recommittal of an auditor's report will properly
be dismissed when it does not set out with particularity the errors complained of.'
It was adjudged that the provisions of Code Section I Io-4o6, relating
to judgment by default in those cases in which an unconditional contract
in writing is sued upon, is confined to cases in which the action is based
directly upon the contract, and that a dispossessory warrant proceeding
for the recovery of premises leased in writing is not a case founded on an
unconditional contract in writing within the meaning of this section, since
the action is not based on the lease. 5
Naturally, many of the questions raised with respect to judgments were
concerned with the amendment, arrest and setting aside of judgments.
Several of these were decided upon the well-established rule that a court
has plenary power over its orders, judgments and decrees during the term
at which they are rendered, and may amend, correct or revoke them for
the purpose of promoting justice. 76 Also, a court may on its own motion,
for cause shown, modify its judgment at the term at which it was rendered,
and where this is done, the good portions of the judgment may be retained
while the bad are eliminated."'
However, a judgment which follows a verdict that is in conformity with
the issues made by the pleadings cannot, at a subsequent term, be amended
on motion, where the matter sought by amendment concerns things that
occurred subsequent to the judgment or concerns matters that could have
been determined on the trial. "8
Where a suit was against a partnership and only one of the partners
was served, a judgment should have been taken against the partnership,
which would have bound any property which the partnership may have
owned as well as that of the partner served. Where the verdict and judgment were against only the partner served, this was at variance with the suit
as laid; and, as such defect is not amendable, the court properly set the judgment aside. " '
It was held that a judgment will not be set aside in equity after the
expiration of the statutory three-year period,' 8' where the complainant had
notice of its existence. 8'

An affidavit of illegality will not lie to go behind a consent judgment.
173. Ingram v. Ingram, 80 Ga. App. 866, 57 S.E.2d 507 (1949) ; Elliott v. Levy, 80 Ga.
App. 501, 56 S.E.2d 863 (1949).
174. Haygood v. Smith, 80 Ga. App. 461, 56 S.E.2d 310 (1949).
175. Holden v. Royal Mfg. Co., 79 Ga. App. 767, 54 S.E.2d 317 (1949).
176. Shivers v. Shivers, 206 Ga. 552, 57 S.E.2d 660 (1950). See also Whitlock v. Wilson,
79 Ga. App. 747, 54 S.E.2d 474 (1949).
177. Davis v. Davis, 206 Ga. 559, 57 S.E.2d 673 (1950).
178. Phillips v. Bowen, 206 Ga. 268, 56 S.E.2d 503 (1949).
179. Grogan v. Herrington, 79 Ga. App. 505, 54 S.E.2d 284 (1949).
180. GA. CODE §§ 3-702, 37-219, 37-220 (1933).

181. Turner v. Avant, 205 Ga. 426, 54 S.E.2d 269 (1949).
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It is not a remedy in equity or for equitable relief, and affords no relief
except as the statute provides." 2
As to the lien of a judgment, it was held that where a debtor has only
the right of possession to money rather than actual possession, this constitutes a chose in action, and that a judgment creates no lien on a chose in
action, but attaches upon service of a summons or garnishment."8 3 This rule
is important in determining priorities in a bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding.
Where, however, a judgment debtor is in actual possession of money, it
may be taken in execution if identifiable as his property.'
The case of Whitlock v Michael' cites Code Section 39-904 to the
effect that where the original entry of levy of an execution did not disclose in whose possession the property was found, the burden of proof
was upon the plaintiff in execution where claim was filed. The case further
holds that although, under Code Section 24-2815, an officer can amend
his return of levy, in this case, after claim was filed and the papers returned to court, he could not do so without permission of the court.
APPEALS

During the period under survey the courts, in adjudicating matters of
appellate procedure and practice, have adhered rather closely to the
established rules and have been rather consistent in their interpretation of
the-revised rules of 1946.18 These rules, which quite naturally presented
many new problems to the attorney when first enacted and which presented
numerous questions for adjudication during the two or three years following their enactment, are now becoming more familiar, and we find
fewer questions depending upon their interpretation. Since, however, our
appellate procedure is not a simple one, many cases still turn upon matters
of preparation of the record in the lower courts and of conduct of the
case in the appellate courts. The cases cited in this portion of the survey
give a fair cross-section of the type of questions which most frequently
arise.
Although there vere few innovations in appellate procedure as a result
of judicial interpretation, there were a number of changes in the rules of
the appellate courts during the last year which will affect the procedure
somewhat, and which should be carefully noted. Attention is first called
to the amendments to the Rules of the Supreme Court.187
On June 28, 1949, Supreme Court Rule 2,188 relating to the practice

before the court by nonresident attorneys was amended. This amendment
did not greatly alter practice before the court, its main features being a
tightening of the rules as to admission by comity so as to require the at182.
183.
184.

Hamilton v. Hamilton, 80 Ga. App. 750, 57 S.E.2d 301 (1950).
McWilliams v. Hemingway, 80 Ga. App. 843, 57 S.E.2d 623 (1950).
Harvey v. Wright, 80 Ga. App. 232, 55 S.E.2d 835 (1949). This appears to be a
very old rule in Georgia, which, however, has not been before the courts during
recent years until the decision in the Harvey case.

185.
186.
187.
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206 Ga. 749, 58 S.E.2d 833 (1950).
Ga. Laws 1946, p. 726.
The full text of these amendments may be found in 205 Ga. at 895.
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4502 (Supp. 1947).
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torney applying to furnish with his application a certificate as to his credentials under the seal of the highest court of his state, district or territory, and by requiring that such certificate also cite the law of the foreign
jurisdiction under which a Georgia attorney is admitted to the courts of
such jurisdiction. The amendment also eliminated the proviso in the former
rule permitting members of the armed forces to take the bar examination
in whatever circuit they happen to be stationed.
On January IO, i95o, the court ordered amendments to Rules I8, 19
and 29(a), and adopted a new rule to be known as Rule 29(a-I). The
substance of these amendments may be stated as follows:
Rule I8,' under the former law, provided that the brief of the plaintiff in error should be'served on the opposing counsel ro days before the
day set for the call of the calendar, and that that of the defendant in
error should be served five days before the call. It was further provided
under the former law, by the last sentence of Rule i9,1" that briefs for
both parties should be filed with the clerk at least three week days before
the call of the calendar. The new Rule 18 now bases the time element on
the filing with the clerk rather than upon the service of the brief, it being
now required that the brief for the plaintiff in error be filed within 15 days
after the docketing of the case, and that the brief of the defendant in error
be filed within 25 days after the case is docketed. There is no longer a
specific provision as to the exact time of service of briefs on opposing
counsel, it being provided that service may be made personally or by mail,
and that service may be shown by acknowledgment, by certificate of counsel
or by the affidavit of the party who delivered or mailed the brief. It is
further provided that all briefs, reply briefs, supplemental briefs, written
arguments and all motions of whatever nature must show that they were
served before they are offered for filing.
Rule 19191 was amended by the court on January io, 195o, by striking
therefrom the last sentence, relating to filing briefs with the clerk three
week days before the call of the calendar, the time of filing now being
regulated by Rule 18, as stated above.
Rule 29(a),"' relating to the closing of dockets, was changed so that
instead of the dockets for the January, April and September terms closing
on the nineteenth day of January, June and October, respectively, they
now close on the eighth day of February, June and October, respectively.
It is still provided that where the closing day is on Sunday, the docket shall
close at noon on the following day.
Rule

reads as follows:
"Rule 29 (a-I). Notice of docketing of cases. Immediately upon the docketing of every case in the Supreme Court the clerk
shall notify by mail counsel for each side of the docketing of the
case and of the calendar to which the case has been assigned."
29(a-I)

This last rule will enable counsel to know when he must file his
brief in accordance with new Rule 18.
189.
190.
191.
192.

GA. CODE § 24-4519 (1933).
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4521 (Supp. 1947).
Ibid.
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4533 (1946 Rev.)
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There were also changes in the Rules of the Court of Appeals,19 the
primary purpose of such changes being to make the procedure conform
with that of the Supreme Court under its new rules.
Rule 21.94 was amended in the same manner as Rule i8 of the Supreme
Court Rules, by striking the requirement as to service of briefs at a stipulated time and substituting therefor a requirement that the brief of counsel
for the plaintiff in error be filed with the clerk within i5 days after the
case is docketed, and that the brief of counsel for the defendant in error be
filed within 25 days after such docketing. This rule also requires that all
briefs be served prior to filing, showing as to service being made as in the
Supreme Court. The rule further incorporates the povision that the clerks
shall notify counsel by mail of the docketing of the case and the calendar to
which it has been assigned, provided the mailing address of counsel is given
in the bill of exceptions.
Rule 22... was amended by striking the words "Filing briefs" from the
caption and by eliminating the former provision which required briefs to be
filed three week days before the call of the calendar.
Rule 3 1,' relating to the closing of dockets, was amended by changing
the date of the closing of dockets for the January, April and September
terms from the twelfth of February, June and October, respectively, to the
third day of each of such months. The remainder of the rule is unchanged.
All of the above amendments to the Rules of the Court of Appeals were
ordered effective as of April i9, I950.
Before going into the more specific points of appellate procedure, it
might be helpful at this time to mention a few recent holdings reiterating
some of the fundamental rules relating to such procedure. There is, for
instance, no presumption in favor of an appealing party. The burden is
upon him asserting error to show it affirmatively by the record; and where
there is no assignment of error which can be determined without a consideration of the evidence, and it appears that all of the evidence material to a
consideration of the error complained of is not lawfully before the court,
it will be assumed that the judgment is correct; and it will be affirmed. " 7
An appellate court is bound by the record as certified by the trial court,
and has no jurisdiction to hear contradictory statements of evidence; 199
and where there is a conflict between the bill of exceptions and the record,
the latter will prevail.'
Where it is possible for an appellate court to correct a judgment without necessitating a complete reversal, it has jurisdiction to do so. Thus,
where the Supreme Court finds a judgment correct except for adding a
certain sum as interest, it will not require a new trial of the case, but will
order the interest to be added."'
193.
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195.
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The 1950 amendments to the Rules of the Court of Appeals are recorded in 80 Ga.
App. at 888-889.
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3621 (Supp. 1947).
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3622 (Supp. 1947).
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3631 (Supp. 1947).
Attaway v. Duncan, 206 Ga. 230, 56 S.E.2d 269 (1949).
Norris v. McDaniel, 80 Ga. App. 734, 57 S.E.2d 299 (1950).
Curtis V. Sharp, 206 Ga. 193, 56 S.E.2d 118 (1949).
Lively v. Lively, 206 Ga. 606, 58 S.E.2d 168 (1950).
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There were the usual number of cases brought to the wrong appellate
court, and transferred to the other court for jurisdictional reasons. The
tendency seems to be for attorneys to bring cases within the jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court, rather than the converse.
During the period studied, the Supreme Court determined that it did not
have jurisdiction of, and transferred to the Court of Appeals, the following matters: a review of an application to sell land, 201 a question of the
constitutionality of a city ordinance, a contempt of court arising from a
processioning procedure," 3 and a petition to annul an adoption decree.20 4
Where an equitable petition is amended without objection, whereby all
equity is eliminated, the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to review a
judgment on demurrer to the amended petition. On the other hand, where
the amendment is demurred to, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to
hear a review of the judgment overruling such demurrer.0 5
While it is axiomatic that only a final judgment is subject to review by
an appellate court,"" a good many cases still illustrate the fact that it is
sometimes difficult for an attorney to determine whether or not he has a
final judgment. No case can be reviewed while a motion for new trial is
still pending in the lower court; and where such a review is attempted, the
writ of error will be dismissed.2 "7 A judgment sustaining a demurrer to a
motion to modify and construe a purported injunctive order is obviously
not final and cannot be reviewed .2 However, a judgment revoking a parol
or suspended sentence in a criminal matter is reviewable by bill of exceptions; and mandamus will lie to compel the certification of such bill of
exceptions. 1°
While it is true that an appellate court will not interfere with the first
grant of a new trial unless the verdict was demanded, 20 there is no technical reason as to why such first grant cannot be reviewed, and where the appellate court determines that the grant was erroneous, it will be set aside." '
Naturally, since the bill of exceptions is the basic pleading in Georgia
appellate procedure, many of the cases decided turn upon the effect, form
and sufficiency of the bill. It has been held that the bill of exceptions will
not act as a supersedeas of the judgment of the trial court unless the statutory provisions"' as to payment of costs and posting of bond or filing of a
pauper's affidavit are complied with. "x3
All parties who are interested in sustaining the judgment excepted to,
or who would be affected by a judgment reversing it, are indispensable parties in the appellate court, and must be named as parties in the bill of ex201.
202.
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Humber v. Garrard, 205 Ga. 357, 53 S.E.2d 748 (1949).
Loomis v. City of Atlanta, 206 Ga. 822, 58 S.E.2d 813 (1950).
Cagle v. Patterson, 206 Ga. 93, 55 S.E.2d 581 (1949).
Respess v. Lites, 206 Ga. 8, 55 S.E.2d 602 (1949).
Wild v. Krenke, 206 Ga. 83, 55 S.E.2d 544 (1949).
See GA. CODE § 6-701 (1933) for the effect of this rule on divorce cases; see also
the portion of this article devoted to Domestic Relations.
Schulman v. Overstreet, 206 Ga. 504, 57 S.E.2d 589 (1950).
Richland Box Co. v. Harbuck, 206 Ga. 555, 57 S.E.2d 666 (1950).
Waters v. Gower, 79 Ga. App. 485, 54 S.E.2d 346 (1949).
Fuller v. Cox, 81 Ga. App. 301, 58 S.E.2d 513 (1950).
Rozenberg v. Sund, 81 Ga. App. 856, 60 S.E.2d 390 (1950).
GA. CoDE § 6-1002 (1933).
Edinfield v. State, 80 Ga. App. 716, 57 S.E.2d 293 (1950).
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ceptions, or the writ of error will be dismissed. Where essential parties are
omitted from the bill of exceptions, the court will dismiss the writ on its
own motion."' Thus, where a trial court sustained a general demurrer and
thereby granted a judgment in favor of all joint defendants, the plaintiff
could not secure a review by naming only one of such defendants in his
bill of exceptions, and by stating that the remaining parties, having been
stricken on demurrer, "are no longer parties to the proceeding. ' 21 5 A different rule prevails, however, where the appealing party is one of several
defendants. It has been held that where the judgment in the trial court is
adverse to several joint defendants, one of them may bring a bill of exceptions without joining his co-defendants therein. -16
Not only must proper parties be made and served with the bill of exceptions, but they must be correctly named therein. The bill must show on its
face affirmatively and unequivocally who the parties are, and the abbreviation, "et al.," occurring after the name of a party is insufficient to include
any person not specifically named. "t " However, where the parties are designated by "et al.," but service of the bill of exceptions is acknowledged by
all necessary parties or their counsel, and the bill is later amended so as to
designate the parties, this is sufficient. -t5 It has also been held that the desig21
nation, "et al.," in a motion for new trial is insufficient but amendable. 9
Although, generally, an assignment of error merely to the effect that
the judgment is contrary to law is insufficient, if an examination of the record discloses that antecedent rulings duly excepted to in the bill 2 of exceptions affected the judgment, the bill of exceptions is sufficient.
Of course, it is well-recognized that any failure to insist upon an exception will be treated as an abandonment. This rule applies to an assignment
- as it does to failure to argue or to insist on grounds for a moof error,221
tion for new trial.2
There has been some further adjudication with reference to the construction of the Act of 1947 223 providing that a brief of evidence need not be filed
with a motion for new trial (and, by inference, with the record on appeal),
where evidence is not essential to an adjudication of the case. It was held
that regardless of this Code section, an appellate court could not, in the
absence of a brief of the evidence, consider rulings on a special demurrer,
where the bill of exceptions also assigned error on the overruling of a motion for new trial, since the court could not, in such case, determine whether the rulings on the demurrer actually constituted harmful error. 2 It
appears that Code Section 70-301.1 is being so strictly construed that it
should be depended upon only in those cases where the attorney is absolute214.
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Whitehead v. Hogan Bros. Lumber Co., 205 Ga. 890, 55 S.E.2d 371 (1949).
Ibid.
Gaither v. Gaither, 206 Ga. 808, 58 S.E.2d 834 (1950).
Lanier v. Bailey, 206 Ga. 161, 56 S.E.2d 515 (1949).
Crain v. Daniel, 79 Ga. App. 647, 54 S.E.2d 487 (1949).
Hartley v. Hartley, 81 Ga. App. 155, 58 S.E.2d 249 (1950).
Gaither v. Gaither, 206 Ga. 808, 58 S.E.2d 834 (1950). For further discussion of
sufficiency of assignment of error, see Henderson v. Henderson, 206 Ga. 23, 55
S.E.2d 578 (1949).
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Dupriest, 81 Ga. App. 773, 59 S.E.2d 767 (1950).
Collier v. Cobb, 81 Ga. App. 712, 59 S.E.2d 672 (1950).
Ga. Laws 1947, p. 298, GA. CODE ANN. § 70-301.1 (Supp. 1947).
Whitner v. Whitner, 80 Ga. App. 831, 57 S.E.2d 451 (1950).
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ly certain that evidence cannot possibly effect the case, and such cases,
wherein a motion for new trial is made, are necessarily very rare.22
It is not only in those cases where a motion for new trial has been made
that a brief of the evidence may be necessary. In the case of Turner v. Turner,22 6 which went to the Supreme Court on a direct bill of exceptions to
review an order granting temporary alimony, the court held: "The provision of Ccde § 70-305 as to briefing the evidence is not confined to cases in
which a motion for new trial is made, but applies also to all writs of error
where questions raised require a review of the evidence."
There still appears to be some confusion between the necessity for notice of presentation of the bill of exceptions to the opposing counsel, as required by Code Section 6-9o8.i, 7 and the actual service of the bill on such
opposing counsel after certification, as required by Code Section 6-9II.
It should be noted that both of these Code sections are still in effect, and
that both notice prior to presentation and service after contification are
required." 8 Failure of a judge to require notice of presentation under Section 6-9o8.i is, however, not reviewable. 2
The rather interesting question as to how service may be perfected on a
nonresident defendant in error who is not represented by counsel is answered by a case holding: "Where there is a non-resident defendant in error
who is not represented by counsel, the bill of exceptions may be served, upon request of counsel for the plaintiff in error, by the clerk of the court by
mailing a copy of the
230 same. There is no other provision of law for service
by mailing a copy.1
Regardless of the Act of 1946,211 which was an apparent effort to liberalize to some extent the rules for construction of the trial judge's certificate to the bill of exceptions, a certificate to the effect that the bill is
true in part and false in part is still not a legal certificate; and the writ of
error formed by the bill of exceptions and such certificate will be dismissed. 32
The provision 3 a requiring tender of the bill of exceptions to the trial
judge within 2o days after the judgment complained of is mandatory; and
although the judge's certificate indicates that it was so tendered, where,
when construed with the remainder of the record, the date on such certificate constitutes a manifest impossibility, and it is obvious that the bill
of exceptions was not tendered within the statutory time, the writ of error
will be dismissed.2 4
225. So far as the writer knows, the courts have given favorable recognition to Code
Section 70-301.1 in only one case, and that was by way of dicta. See Huguley v.
Huguley, 204 Ga. 692, 51 S.E.2d 445 (1949), wherein the case of Morris v. Braddy,
203 Ga. 349, 46 S.E.2d 639 (1948) was modified insofar as it conflicts with the
statute.
226. 205 Ga. 578, 54 S.E.2d 410 (1949).
227. GA. CODE ANN. § 6-908.1 (Supp. 1947).
228. Hendrix v. Toledious, 80 Ga. App. 160, 55 S.E.2d 752 (1949). See also Irwin v. LeCraw, 206 Ga. 702, 58 S.E.2d 383 (1950).
229. GA. CODE ANN. § 6-909 (Supp. 1947). See Horne v. Skinner, 206 Ga. 491, 57 S.E.2d
576 (1950).
230. Bodenheimer v. Fulton Nat. Bank, 205 Ga. 829, 55 S.E.2d 357 (1949).
231. Ga. Laws 1946, pp. 726, 732, GA. CODE ANN. § 6-806 (Supp. 1947).
2.32. Youmans v. Consumers Financing Corp., 80 Ga. App. 676, 57 S.E.2d 238 (1949).
233. GA. CODE ANN. § 6-905 (Supp. 1947).
234. Curtis v. Sharp. 206 Ga. 193, 56 S.E.2d 118 (1949).
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It is being consistently held by the Court of Appeals that the 2o-day
rule as to tender of the bill of exceptions applies only to superior courts,
and that where a statute creating an inferior court or tribunal lays down
a different rule, such special statute will prevail. Therefore, a bill of exceptions which is not tendered to the judge within IS days after final judgment in the Civil Court of Fulton County, for example, is too late.235
Although, as we have seen,23 the certification of a bill of exceptions can
be compelled by mandamus in a proper case, the writ will not always be
granted. It has been held that since motions for new trial on extraordinary
grounds are not favored, a trial judge may refuse to grant such motions
where there is no abuse of discretion, and may refuse to certify bills of exceptions based upon such rulings. Where mandamus is filed in the appellate
court to compel certification of such a bill of exceptions, the appellate
court will look to the entire record, and if it determines that the motion
for new trial should not have been granted, no writ of mandamus will issue.
The transmission of the record in a case from the trial court to the
appellate court is the duty of the clerk, and the parties will not ordinarily
be penalized for his failure. However, where the delay of the clerk resulting in a failure to prepare and certify a transcript of record within
the time prescribed by the law was not caused by his own laches, but by
the active interposition of the counsel for the plaintiff in error, the writ
of error was properly dismissed."'
The effect of the remittitur of an appellate court is stated in the case
of Estes v. Estes239 as follows: "Where, in affirming a judgment, this court
gives direction to the trial court to amend its decree in a certain specified
manner, the trial court on receipt of the remittitur has no power or discretion to vary or modify the direction given, but must enter judgment in
compliance with the instructions contained therein."
237

CERTIORARI

In making any review of the Georgia law of certiorari, one is always
struck with the almost inescapable conclusion that the whole procedure has
been set up more for the purpose of terminating litigation by means of technicalities than with an intention to provide a method of review. This is
true because the petitioner in certiorari is circumscribed with a number of
very precise regulations, failure in any detail of which will result in the
dismissal of his petition and loss of the case. This can best be illustrated
with a few cases.
Under Code Section I9-2IO, all certiorari proceedings must be filed in
the clerk's office within io days from the date of their sanction. Therefore,
where a petition for certiorari was presented to the judge of the superior
court on February 23 for sanction, and the entire record was delivered to
235.
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the defendant in certiorari, and not returned into court until April 9, there
was no filing in accordance with the law, and the petition for certiorari
had to be dismissed.4
When a petitioner in certiorari has drawn and filed his proceedings, even
if all intermediate requirements are complied with, he is by no means
through, for he must not only see that the judge of the lower court answers
within the required time but must carefully consider the answer when it is
filed in order to determine its effect, and file a proper traverse in case he
does not feel that it fairly states the history of the case. Where, for instance, the answer of a justice of the peace is not traversed, such answer
alone will'be looked to to determine what happened on the trial; and if the
matter revealed in the answer denies some material portion of the contentions of the petitioner, the certiorari will be dismissed.""
As to the duties of the judge of the superior court on certiorari, it has
been ruled that he is to render a final judgment when there is an error of
law involved which must finally govern the case and no question of fact is
involved; but in other cases, depending on the circumstances, he may order
the certiorari dismissed, or may return the same to the court from which it
came, with instructions. He has a wide discretion in granting a retrial in
the lower court, where the evidence is conflicting and error is assigned on
the judgment (or verdict and judgment where a jury is involved) as contrary to law and evidence; but in such event he does not have the authority
to sustain the certiorari and then render a final judgment.4
240. Hunter v. City of Blue Ridge, 79 Ga. App. 719, 54 S.E.2d 510 (1949).
241. Roberson v. Fowler, 80 Ga. App. 248, 55 S.E.2d 835 (1949).
242. Deaton v. Taliaferro, 80 Ga. App. 685, 57 S.E.2d 215 (1950).

